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Abstract. By combining Shannon’s cryptography model with an as-
sumption to the lower bound of adversaries’ uncertainty to the queried
dataset, we develop a secure Bayesian inference-based privacy model and
then in some extent answer Dwork et al.’s question [1]: “why Bayesian
risk factors are the right measure for privacy loss”.
This model ensures an adversary can only obtain little information of
each individual from the model’s output if the adversary’s uncertainty
to the queried dataset is larger than the lower bound. Importantly, the
assumption to the lower bound almost always holds, especially for big
datasets. Furthermore, this model is flexible enough to balance privacy
and utility: by using four parameters to characterize the assumption,
there are many approaches to balance privacy and utility and to discuss
the group privacy and the composition privacy properties of this model.
Keywords: perfect secrecy, differential privacy, adversary’s knowledge, infor-
mation privacy, dependent information
1 Introduction
Data privacy protection [2,3,4] studies how to query dataset while preserving the
privacy of individuals whose sensitive information is contained in the dataset.
The crux of this field is to find suitable privacy protection model which can
provide better tradeoffs between privacy protection and data utility. Differential
privacy model [5,6] is currently the most important and popular privacy protec-
tion model. Dwork [2] illustrated differential privacy as “differential privacy will
ensure that the ability of an adversary to inflict harm (or good, for that mat-
ter)of any sort, to any set of peopleshould be essentially the same, independent of
whether any individual opts in to, or opts out of, the dataset.” This illustration
can be explained as that differential privacy minimizes the increased risk to an
individual’s privacy incurred by joining (or leaving) the dataset of the individual.
This implies that differential privacy seldom cares about the increased risk to
the individual’s privacy incurred by joining (or leaving) the dataset of other indi-
viduals, which is unreasonable since other individuals’ data may also be related
to the individual’s privacy.3 For example, to a dataset containing individuals’
3 It seems that an individual can’t legally claim a breach of his privacy if the breach
is due to other individuals’ data. However, this doesn’t mean that the individual
doesn’t fear this kind of privacy breach.
2 Genqiang Wu, Xianyao Xia and Yeping He
genomic data [7,8], the joining of an old man’s 100 descendants clearly increases
the risk to the man’s privacy. In this paper, we will formally analyze the influ-
ence of the other individuals’ joining the dataset to an individual’s privacy and
propose our solution.
Our powerful tool to analyze the influence is derived from Shannon’s perfect
secrecy [9], whose computational complexity relaxation is the famous semantic
security [10], one fundamental concept in cryptography. Specifically, the perfect
secrecy ensures that outputs (or ciphertexts) of a crypto system contain no
information about inputs (or plaintexts), i.e., no information about the inputs
can be extracted by any adversary, and the semantic security implies that any
information revealed cannot be extracted by the probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversaries [10,11][12, p. 476]. To discuss the privacy problems more
precisely, let us first review Shannon’s theory to cryptography.
In Shannon’s theory [9,11,10], a cryptography model/system is defined as a
set of (probabilistic) transformations of the plaintext universe into the cipher-
text universe. Each particular transformation of the set corresponds to encipher-
ing with a particular key. The transformations are supposed reversible so that
unique deciphering is possible when the key is known [10,13]. For a plaintext X
and a secret key K, let Y be the corresponding ciphertext. Consider X,K, Y
as random variables, where the probability distributions of X,K, Y are the ad-
versary’s probabilities for the choices in question, and represent his knowledge
of the situation. Then the mutual information I(X ;Y ) [14] or the max-mutual
information I∞(X ;Y ), defined in Definition 3, will be a measure of information
about X which the adversary obtains from Y . The perfect secrecy is defined
as I∞(X ;Y ) = 0 and the semantic security is defined as I∞(X ;Y ) = O(1/m
t)
[10,11].
We now borrow the above Shannon’s cryptography models to construct data
privacy models. In a (data) privacy model/system there are n ≥ 1 individuals
X1, . . . , Xn. A dataset x := {x1, . . . , xn} is a (multi)set of records, where each xi
is an assignment ofXi. For a query f : D → R [15], a privacy model is defined as a
set of (probabilistic) transformations of the set D of possible datasets into the set
R of possible query outputs Y . Each particular transformation of the set is called
a (privacy) mechanism. Note that, being different from the cryptography models,
a mechanism does not need to be reversible since there is no deciphering step in
the privacy models.4 This implies that the data consumer and the adversary are
indistinguishable in their ways to extract information contained in Y . For the
query f and the dataset x, the output Y is a probabilistic approximation of f(x),
which implies that we can use the expected distortion between f(x) and Y to
measure data utility, whose formal definition is deferred until Section 3.2. Note
4 Note that one difference between privacy models and cryptography models is that,
for different outputs in cryptography, the secret key is unchanged and the plaintexts
are changing, but that, for different outputs in privacy protection, the “plaintext”,
i.e., the dataset x, is unchanged and the implicit “secret keys” may be changing. Or
equivalently, in privacy protection, one can consider the dataset as the “secret key”
to encrypt the implicit “plaintexts”.
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that a differential privacy mechanism is a special kind of privacy mechanisms
defined as above, which is formally defined in Definition 2.
Consider Xi, Y as random variables, whose probability distributions are the
adversary’s probabilities for the choices in question, and represent his knowledge
of the situation. Then the max-mutual information I∞(Xi;Y ) will be the amount
of information about the individual Xi which the adversary obtains from Y .
Following the semantic security and the perfect secrecy, the setting I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤
ǫ with ǫ > 0 would be a reasonable choice as a privacy concept. One needs to be
mentioned is that the “perfect privacy” [16,17], i.e., the setting I∞(Xi;Y ) = 0,
is not practical since this will result in poor data utility even in the assumption
of the PPT adversaries by the results in [6]. Due to technical reasons, the formal
definition of the privacy concept is deferred until Section 3.
One may find an interesting thing that we seem to pick up the semantic secu-
rity that Dwork et al. had claimed to be impractical to privacy problems [6,2][18,
Section 2.2]. We stress that Dwork [6] mainly proves that the “perfect privacy”,
i.e., the setting I∞(Xi;Y ) = 0, is impractical due to poor data utility (even in
the assumption of the PPT adversary), but seldom claims that I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ is
impractical. In this paper, we will continue Dwork’s work [6] to discuss whether
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ is suitable to be a privacy concept, and accurately in what extent
to be; that is, we will employ Shannon’s theory to answer Dwork et al.’s question
[1]: “why Bayesian risk factors are the right measure for privacy loss”. We will
also continue Dwork’s work [6] to discuss the tight upper bound of I∞(Xi;Y ) for
the differential privacy output Y , which is obviously important but is neglected
by Dwork [6] and the related works [19,20]. In fact, we have the following result.
Corollary 1 (Corollary of Proposition 4). The mechanism M satisfies
maxi∈[n] I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ nǫ for all X := (X1, . . . , Xn) if and only if M satisfies
max
x,y∈D,r∈R
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(y) = r]
:= max
x,y∈D,r∈R
Pr[Y = r|X = x]
Pr[Y = r|X = y]
≤ exp(nǫ). (1)
Note that (1) is implied when M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy by the group
privacy property of differential privacy in Lemma 1. Therefore, Corollary 1 im-
plies that ǫ-differential privacy mechanism M allows its output Y such that
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≈ nǫ, which will disclose too much information about the individual
Xi so long as the number n of individuals is large enough, and which is our
main motivation. For the ǫ-differential privacy mechanism M, one interesting
thing in Corollary 1 is that the nǫ in (1), which is intended to be the maximal
amount of disclosed information, or in other words the privacy budget [1], to the
group X1, . . . , Xn of individuals by the theory of differential privacy, however,
becomes the maximal amount of disclosed information to the individual Xi. We
will show in Proposition 4 that this is due to the other individuals’ data also
contains information of the individual Xi.
One needs to be emphasized is that it is reasonable to accept I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ
as one minimal requirement for any secure privacy mechanism. The reason is
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the same as that I∞(X ;Y ) ≈ 0 is one mininal requirement for secure cryptog-
raphy models since large I∞(X ;Y ) must result in information disclosure of the
plaintext X , which has been testified for more than 60 years.
Definition 1 (The Knowledge of an Adversary). Let the random vector
X := (X1, . . . , Xn) denote the uncertainty of an adversary to the queried dataset.
Then X or its probability distribution is called the knowledge of the adversary.
Note that, before this paper, there have been many Bayesian inference-based
privacy models, such as [17,21,19,20,22]. These models share a common feature:
they all restrict adversaries’ knowledges. Many results, such as those in [19,22]
and Proposition 4 of this paper, show that this restriction is inevitable for better
utility. Traditionally, it is direct to restrict adversaries to be PPT as in cryptog-
raphy. However, the current studies in data privacy don’t suggest this restriction
since most current works in data privacy are not based on it [18,23,24,25]. On
the other hand, the current works to restrict adversaries’ knowledges are almost
no discussion on what are reasonable assumptions [17,21,19,20,22]. Note that
the main obstacle to adopt these privacy models is that these models put re-
strictions to adversaries’ knowledges but can’t provide the reasonability of these
restrictions. In this paper, our restriction to adversaries’ knowledges is shown in
Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. Let b be a positive constant. Then, for any one adversary’s
knowledge X, there must be H(X) ≥ b, where H(X) is the entropy of X.
We have the following evidences to support the reasonability of the restric-
tion.
1. The maximal entropy maxX H(X), in general, is huger in privacy models
than in cryptography models. For example, to the AES-256 encryption model
[13], the adversary only needs to recover the 256 bits secret key in order to
recover the information contained in the output Y and therefore it is reason-
able to assume that H(X) can be very small or even zero since H(X) is at
most 256 bits. However, to the Netflix Prize dataset [26] in data privacy, the
adversary, in principle, needs to recover the whole dataset in order to recover
the information contained in the output Y 5 and therefore it is reasonable to
assume that H(X) is relatively large since the Netflix Prize dataset is large
and then maxX H(X) is at least larger than 100, 480, 507 bits, which is huge
compared to 256 bits.6
2. The long tail phenomenon7 implies that there are too much “outlier data”
in big dataset, which increases the uncertainty H(X).
5 Note that there is no fixed “secret key” in data privacy protection models.
6 The Netflix Prize dataset contains 100, 480, 507 movie ratings and each rating has
at least two choices [26].
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_tail
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3. Someone may doubt of the assumption since there are too much background
knowledge in data privacy protection compared to in cryptography. For ex-
ample, to the Netflix Prize dataset [26], it is inevitable that there exists open
data, such as the IMDb dataset, as the adversary’s background knowledge.
Our comment is that, when the dataset is large enough, such as the Netflix
dataset, the background knowledge, such as the IMDb dataset, in general,
can’t have large part, such as over 50%, to be overlapped with the secret
dataset. In fact, the Netflix Prize dataset has very small part to be over-
lapped with the IMDb dataset. Therefore, the entropy H(X) is still large
for big dataset even though the diversity of background knowledges.
4. Theoretically, a dataset can be completely recovered by querying the dataset
too many times as noted in [27,28][18, Chapter 8]; that is, theoretically, the
entropy H(X) can be very small or even zero [9, p. 659]. However, if we
restrict the query times8 and assume the dataset is big enough, we can
ensure H(X) to be not too small.
Due to the above evidences, it would be reasonable to adopt Assumption 1 as
a reasonable restriction to adversaries’ knowledges. Notice that Assumption 1
can achieve the idea of “crowd-blending privacy” (but with a way different from
[30,31]), where each individual’s privacy is related to other individuals’ data;
that is, if some other individuals’ data is kept private, then Assumption 1 holds,
which in turn ensure I(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ to be holding.
1.1 Contribution and Outline
This paper aims to provide some “mathematical underpinnings of formal pri-
vacy notions” [1] and tries to answer “why Bayesian risk factors are the right
measure for privacy loss” [1] by employing Shannon’s cryptography model and
Assumption 1. Our contributions focus on studying how to control I∞(Xi;Y )
and related quantities based on Assumption 1.
1. We introduce Assumption 1 into privacy models. Compared to the restric-
tions to adversaries’ knowledges in [17,21,19,20,22], the restriction in As-
sumption 1 is much more reasonable and universally applicable, especially
for big datasets.
2. Four parameters are developed to characterize Assumption 1, which makes
it easy to control I∞(Xi;Y ) and to discuss utility. This part is our main
contribution; many bounds of I∞(Xi;Y ) and of utility are obtained.
3. We formalize the group privacy, i.e., the privacy of a group of individuals,
and the composition privacy, i.e., the privacy problem when multiple results
are output, of the information privacy model. Several results are proved.
8 The differential privacy model also needs to restrict the query times [18, Chapter
8] and a cryptography model also needs to change its secret key after a time of
usage. Furthermore, it seems to be computationally impractical to query a much big
dataset too many times [29].
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The following part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
some preliminaries. Section 3 introduces the information privacy model and com-
pares it with other privacy models. In Section 4 we discuss the tradeoffs between
privacy and utility based on Assumption 1. Section 5 discusses how to preserve
the privacy of a group of individuals. Section 6 discusses the privacy problem
when multiple results are output. Section 7 gives other related works. Section 8
concludes the results.
2 Preliminaries
The notational conventions of this paper are summarized in Table 1, of which
some are borrowed from information theory [14].
2.1 The Setting
This section provides mathematical settings of our model, where most materi-
als contain many mathematical symbols and seem to be boring. However, we
emphasize that these symbols are necessary to make the presentation clear and
shorter. Therefore, the readers can skip these settings at a first reading and go
back to consult them later where necessary.
Let the random variables X1, . . . , Xn denote n individuals. Let Xi denote
the record universe of Xi. The probability distribution of Xi denotes an ad-
versary’s knowledge about the individual Xi’s record. A dataset is a collection
(a multiset) of n records x1, . . . , xn, where xi ∈ Xi denotes the assignment of
Xi. We differentiate a record sequence (x1, . . . , xn) from a dataset {x1, . . . , xn}
the record sequence corresponds to: the former has order among the records
but the later does not. The universe of record sequences Z is defined as Z =
{(x1, . . . , xn) : xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ [n]}. The universe of datasets D is defined as
D = {{x1, . . . , xn} : xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ [n]}. We remark that D is not a multiset,
in which the same datasets are merged as one dataset. There may be multi-
ple record sequences which correspond to a same dataset. We call the dataset
{x1, . . . , xn} as the dataset of the record sequence (x1, . . . , xn). For a dataset
y ∈ D, let Dy denote the set of all record sequences corresponding to the same
dataset y.
Set X = (X1, . . . , Xn). Set X(i) = (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn), X(i) =∏
j∈[n]\{i} Xj and x(i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Let F (x), x ∈ Z denote the
probability distribution of X . For each y ∈ D, set
F (y) :=
∑
x∈Dy
F (x). (2)
In this manner, X can also be considered as a D-valued random variable with
the probability distribution F (y), y ∈ D. Let P denote the universe of probability
distributions over Z (or over D). Note that, by letting all adversaries’ knowl-
edges be derived from a subset ∆ of P, we achieve a restriction to adversaries’
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knowledges. If the probability distribution of the random variable X is within
∆, we say that X is in ∆, denoted as X ∈ ∆.
For a query function f , let R ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ D} denote a set including all
possible query results. Let P(R) denote the set of all the probability distributions
on R. A mechanism M takes a record sequence x ∈ Z as input and outputs a
random variableM(x) valued in R. Let Y be the random variable denoting the
adversary’s observation about the output. In this manner, for x ∈ Z and r ∈ R,
we set
Pr[M(x) = r] := Pr[Y = r|X = x]. (3)
In this paper, we abuse the notation M(x) as either denoting a probability
distribution in P(R) or denoting a random variable following the probability
distribution. Furthermore, for any x ∈ D, set M(y) ≡ M(z) for any two y, z ∈
Dx. Therefore, for a dataset x ∈ D, we set M(x) :=M(z) for z ∈ Dx.
In this paper, we append an empty record, denoted as ⊥, to each Xi. In this
setting, if xi = ⊥, it means that the individual Xi does not generate record
in the dataset x. Let X = ∪ni=1Xi \ {⊥}. For a dataset x ∈ D, we use the
histogram representation x ∈ N¯|X | to denote the dataset x, where the ith entry
of x represents the number of elements in x of type i ∈ X [32,18,33]. Two
datasets x, y ∈ D are said to be neighbors (or neighboring datasets) of distance
k if ‖x−y‖1 = k. If k = 1, x, y are said to be neighbors (or neighboring datasets).
Two record sequences x, x′ ∈ Z are said to be neighbors (or neighboring record
sequences) if their corresponding datasets are neighbors.
For notational simplicity, in the following of this paper, we assume Z and D
are both discrete.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy characterizes the changes of outputs when one’s record in a
dataset is changed. The later changing is captured by the notion of the neigh-
boring datasets.
Definition 2 (ǫ-Differential Privacy [5,6,18]). Let the notations be as in
Section 2.1. A mechanism M : D → P(R) gives ǫ-differential privacy if
max
x,x′∈D,r∈R:‖x−x′‖1=1
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
≤ exp(ǫ), (4)
where Pr[M(x) = r] := Pr[Y = r|X = x].
Note that Definition 2 is the same as those in [34,35], and is also equivalent
to the definition of differential privacy in [5,6,18].
Differential privacy has group privacy property, which ensures that the strength
of the privacy guarantee drops linearly with the size of the group of individuals.
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Lemma 1 (Group Privacy [18]). Let M be an ǫ-differentially private mech-
anism. Then
max
x,y∈D,r∈R:‖x−y‖1≤s
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(y) = r]
≤ exp (sǫ) . (5)
The composition privacy of differential privacy implies that the strength of
the privacy guarantee drops in a controllable way when the number of outputs
about a dataset raises.
Lemma 2 (Composition Privacy [18]). Let the mechanism Mi satisfy ǫi-
differential privacy on Ri for i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Then the composition mecha-
nism M, defined as M(x) = (M1(x), . . . , Ms(x)), x ∈ D, satisfies
∑s
i=1 ǫi-
differential privacy on the cartesian set
∏s
i=1R
i.
2.3 Other Materials
Lemma 3. Let g(x) = a0+a1x
b0+b1x
, x ∈ R and let ai ≥ 0, bi > 0 for i ∈ {0, 1}. If
a0
b0
< a1
b1
, then g(x) is increasing. Otherwise, if a0
b0
≥ a1
b1
, then g(x) is decreasing.
Proof. Note that the derivative of g(x) is g′(x) = a1b0−a0b1(b0x+b1)2 , by which the claims
are immediate. ⊓⊔
Definition 3 (Max-Mutual Information [36]). The max-mutual informa-
tion of the random variables X,Y is defined as
I∞(X ;Y ) = max
x∈X ,r∈R
log
Pr[X = x, Y = r]
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = r]
= max
x∈X ,r∈R
log
Pr[X = x|Y = r]
Pr[X = x]
.
Lemma 4. There is I(X ;Y ) ≤ I∞(X ;Y ).
Proof. By the definition of I(X ;Y ) [14], there is
I(X ;Y ) =
∑
x∈X ,r∈R
Pr[X = x, Y = r] log
Pr[X = x, Y = r]
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = r]
(6)
≤
∑
x∈X ,r∈R
Pr[X = x, Y = r]I∞(X ;Y ) = I∞(X ;Y ). (7)
The claim is proved. ⊓⊔
3 The Model of Information Privacy
Now it’s time to give the formal definition of privacy concept. As discussed in
Section 1, our privacy concept is to limit the amount of information of each in-
dividual Xi obtained by the adversary from the output Y , i.e., control the value
of the max-mutual information I∞(Xi;Y ) or the mutual information I(X ;Y ).
For mathematical convenience, we only consider how to control the quantity
I∞(Xi;Y ) in this paper. We formalize the discussions in Section 1 as the follow-
ing definition.
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Definition 4 (ǫ-Information Privacy). Let ∆ ⊆ P. Let M : D → P(R) be a
mechanism and let Y be the output random variable. The mechanismM satisfies
ǫ-information privacy with respect to ∆ if for any X ∈ ∆ and i ∈ [n] there is
max
xi∈Xi,r∈R
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi,x(i))=r] Pr[X(i)=x(i)|Xi=xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi=x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′
i
,x(i))=r] Pr[X(i)=x(i)|Xi=x
′
i
] ≤ exp(ǫ).
(8)
Note that the inequality (8) is equivalent to
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ (9)
since
Pr[Xi = xi, Y = r]
Pr[Xi = xi] Pr[Y = r]
=
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
.
(10)
The parameter ∆ in the above definition is used to model adversaries’ knowl-
edges. In this paper, we mainly set ∆ to be
∆b := {X ∈ P : H(X) ≥ b}, (11)
which will be discussed in Section 4.
In information theory, the relative entropy is used to measure the distance
between two probability distributions and the mutual information is used to
measure the amount of information that one random variable contains about
another random variable [14]. The relative entropy of (Xi|Y = r) and Xi, de-
noted as D((Xi|Y = r)‖Xi), and the mutual information of Xi and Y , i.e.,
I(Xi;Y ), have the following results.
Proposition 1. Let the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with re-
spect to X and let Y be its output random variable. We have
max
r∈R
D((Xi|Y = r)‖Xi) ≤ ǫ and I(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ, (12)
for i ∈ [n].
Proof. The proof is direct and is omitted here. ⊓⊔
Note that, as Definition 4, we can also define the ǫ-relative entropy privacy,
i.e., maxrD((Xi|Y = r)‖Xi) ≤ ǫ, and the ǫ-mutual information privacy, i.e.,
I(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ. Furthermore, the paper [37] proposes a privacy concept called
ǫ-inferential privacy, i.e.,
max
xi,x
′
i
,r
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
≤ exp(ǫ). (13)
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Note also that the inequalities (1) and (2) in [19] are essentially equivalent to
the inequality (13). We now discuss the relations among the above three privacy
concepts and the ǫ-information privacy. There are the following results.
Proposition 2. We have the following relation among the privacy concepts: ǫ-
inferential privacy ⇒a ǫ-information privacy ⇒b ǫ-relative entropy privacy ⇒c
ǫ-mutual information privacy.
Proof. The claim ⇒a is due to the inequality
max
x′
i
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
≥
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
.
The claim ⇒b is due to Proposition 1. The claim ⇒c is due to the equation
I(Xi;Y ) =
∑
r∈R
Pr[Y = r]D((Xi|Y = r)‖Xi).
The claims are proved. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 shows that the four privacy concepts, ǫ-inferential privacy, ǫ-
information privacy, ǫ-relative entropy privacy and ǫ-mutual information privacy,
are in decreasing order in terms of their strength to protect privacy. One can
choose any one of the four concepts as the privacy concept, of which the choosing
criterion depends on the privacy level of demand.
Proposition 3 (Data-Processing Inequality/Post-Processing). Assume
the mechanism M : D → P(R) satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to
∆ and let Y be its output random variable. Let Z = g(Y ) and let R′ = {g(r) :
r ∈ R}. Then the composed mechanism g ◦ M : D → P(R′) satisfies ǫ-mutual
information privacy with respect to ∆, where g ◦M(x) := g(M(x)) for x ∈ D.9
Proof. Recall that ǫ-mutual information privacy ofM is implied by its ǫ-information
privacy by Proposition 2. Then the claim is a direct corollary of the data-
processing inequality in [14, Theorem 2.8.1]. ⊓⊔
It is direct to define the personalized information privacy as the personalized
differential privacy [38].
Definition 5 (ǫ-Personalized Information Privacy). The mechanism M
satisfies ǫ-personalized information privacy with respect to ∆ if, for each X ∈ ∆
and each i ∈ [n], there is
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫi, (14)
where ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn).
9 Currently, we can’t strengthen the result to be ǫ-information privacy since we can’t
prove the data-processing inequality to the max-mutual information I∞.
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3.1 Comment on Parameter Setting
In this section we consider how to set the parameter D (or Z) of the information
privacy model. The setting of the parameter ∆ is deferred to Section 4.
One needs to be emphasized is that the dataset universe D (or the record
sequence universe Z) should be set carefully since D itself may leak individuals’
privacy and result in tracing attacks [28]. In order to see the above result clearly,
we consider the query function f(x) = x, x ∈ D as an example, which can be
considered as the abstraction of data publishing function [39,40,41]. Note that
the codomain of f is R = {f(x) : x ∈ D} = D. Both of the differential pri-
vacy model and the information privacy model employ randomized techniques
to protect privacy: When the real dataset is x, in order to preserve privacy, a
privacy mechanism first samples a dataset y ∈ D (according to a probability
distribution) and then outputs f(y) ∈ R as the final query result of f . Or equiv-
alently, the privacy mechanism directly samples a value r from the codomain R
of f as the final query result. The major difference of the two models is that
the probability distributions used to sample y or r are different. Assume that
the individual Xi’s record universe Xi has no overlapped record with all other
individuals’ record universes. Then, finding a record ri ∈ Xi within an output
dataset x would strongly conclude the participation of the individual Xi, which
obviously is a successful tracing attack. Therefore, we should set appropriate D
and therefore appropriate Xi for i ∈ [n] such that the set D itself does not leak
the participation of an individual. The privacy-oriented (but less utility-oriented)
setting is to set Xi = X for all i ∈ [n] as in [18, p. 227].
3.2 Utility Measure
For the query f and the dataset universe D, let the set R ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ D}. We
equip a metric d over the set R [15]. That is, the parity (R, d) is a metric space.
Note that the outputM(x) of the mechanismM is a probabilistic approximation
of f(x). Therefore,
for two datasets x, y, if ‖x−y‖1 is large, the distance of the outputs
M(x),M(y) being small would result in poor data utility.
In most parts of this paper, the above utility measuring method can be used
to measure the utility of mechanisms. However, for the completeness of this
paper, we will present the formal definition of utility measure in (15). Note that
the two utility measure methods are consistent since the former will result in
M(x), x ∈ D be more similar with the uniform probability distribution on R,
which obviously raises the distortion of d(f(X), Y ).
Let Fo(x), x ∈ D denote the occurring probability distribution of the indi-
viduals X . Then the utility of the mechanism M is measured by the expected
value of the distortion d(f(X), Y ), i.e.,
E[d(f(X), Y )] =
∑
x∈D,r∈R
Pr[X = x, Y = r]d(f(x), r)
=
∑
x∈D,r∈R
Fo(x) Pr[M(x) = r]d(f(x), r).
(15)
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We stress that Fo(x), x ∈ D is different from the probability distribution F (x), x ∈
D defined in (2), where the former is the factual occurring probabilities of
datasets but the later denotes the knowledge of the adversary to datasets.
The third quantity to measure the utility is I(X ;Y ) or I∞(X ;Y ), which is
used to measure the information of the individuals X contained in the output Y .
Note that large I(X ;Y ) implies better utility of the mechanism since the output
Y contains more information about X that the mining or learning algorithms
can mine or learn.
3.3 Some Related Works
One motivation of this paper is to solve the weakness of the differential privacy
model [5,6] as shown in Corollary 1, which implies that the differential privacy
model allows I∞(Xi;Y ) to be very large. Corollary 2, which is also appeared in
[19,22], shows that the differential privacy model is equivalent to the information
privacy model with respect to P1. Note that the setting P1 is obviously less
reasonable than the setting (11). Therefore, the information privacy model with
respect to (11) is more reasonable than the differential privacy model.
As noted in Section 1, the models in [17,21,19,20,22] and the information
privacy model all are the Bayesian inference-based models and restrict adver-
saries’ knowledges; that is, they all employ a subset of P, like ∆ in this paper, to
model adversaries’ knowledges. The advantage of these models and the restric-
tions is clear: powerful both to model privacy problems and to balance privacy
and utility. However, the disadvantage is also large: the restrictions seem to be
unreasonable since there are many examples, where making such a restriction
may quickly lead to a disastrous breach of privacy. We imagine that the first
impressions of most readers to these privacy models in [17,21,19,20,22] are sim-
ilar with ours: Compared to conciseness of the differential privacy model, these
privacy models set too many kinds of ∆’s but none of these settings seems to be
reasonable, which makes it hard to adopt these models. However, the rigorous
analysis of the privacy problems by using Shannon’s cryptography theory as in
Section 1 makes us revisit these models, which results in the introduction of the
parameter ∆ into the information privacy model. Of course, we also face the
problem of how to find a reasonable ∆. Assumption 1 is our solution and the ev-
idences in Section 1 show that it is reasonable, especially for big datasets. In the
following sections of this paper we will present our results based on Assumption
1.
Furthermore, the papers [17,19,42,43] discuss the impact of previously re-
leased data or query results, called constraints, to the privacy guarantee. The
information privacy model treat these constraints by using Assumption 1; this is,
these constraints can be summarized as the adversary’s knowledge to the queried
dataset, and if these constraints can’t result in the adversary’s knowledge go out
of the set ∆ in (11), then we can ensure the adversary can only obtain little
information of each individual. Note that the above treatment to the constraints
is similarly with the semantic security model in cryptography.
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The papers [44,45,34] employ either I(X ;Y ) ≤ ǫ or I∞(X ;Y ) ≤ ǫ to define
privacy concepts. We stress that both of the above two inequalities will result in
poor data utility. The reason is that I(X ;Y ) or I∞(X ;Y ) is just the amount of
information of X contained in Y that the data consumer needs to mine since the
data consumer is also a special kind of adversaries. In contrast, the inequalities
I(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ, I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ only restrict the information disclosure of each
individual Xi, which, in general, allows the quantities I(X ;Y ) or I∞(X ;Y ) to
be large enough, so long as the number of individuals n is large enough.
4 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff for Big Dataset
In this section, we consider how to set the parameter∆ in Definition 4 in order to
give appropriate privacy-utility tradeoffs, where ∆ denotes adversaries’ knowl-
edges. As noted in Section 3, the setting in (11) is a reasonable restriction to
adversaries’ knowledges. Before discussing the information privacy model based
on this setting, we first discuss why we must restrict adversaries’ knowledges.
The following results show that the setting ∆ = P will result in poor utility.
Proposition 4. The following three conditions are equivalent:
1. maxi∈[n] I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ with respect to ∆ = P.
2. I∞(X ;Y ) ≤ ǫ with respect to ∆ = P.
3. maxr∈R,x,x′∈D
Pr[M(x)=r]
Pr[M(x′)=r] ≤ exp(ǫ).
Proof. The equivalence between the claim 1 and the claim 3 is due to∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
≤ max
(x′
i
,x′
(i)
)∈Z
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r]
Pr[M(x′i, x
′
(i)) = r]
,
(16)
with equality when the record sequence (x′i, x
′
(i)) ∈ Z satisfies Pr[Xi = x
′
i] = 1
and Pr[X(i) = x
′
(i)|Xi = x
′
i] = 1, where (x
′
i, x
′
(i)) is just the record sequence
satisfying the above maximality.
The equivalence between the claim 2 and the claim 3 is due to
Pr[Y = r,X = x]
Pr [Y = r] Pr[X = x]
=
Pr[M(x) = r]∑
x′∈Z Pr[M(x
′) = r] Pr[X = x′]
≤ max
x′∈Z
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
,
(17)
with equality when the record sequence x′ ∈ Z satisfies Pr[X = x′] = 1, where
x′ is just the record sequence satisfying the above maximality.
The proof is complete. ⊓⊔
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The claim 2 of Proposition 4 shows that ǫ-information privacy with respect
to P will result in poor utility since I∞(X ;Y ) ≤ ǫ but I∞(X ;Y ) denotes the
information of X contained in Y , which is just the information the utility needs.
Note also that the claim 3 of Proposition 4 shows that ǫ-information privacy
with respect to P will result in two datasets even with distance n must have
similar outputs, which obviously results in poor utility. Therefore, it is needed
to restrict adversaries’ knowledges for better utility.
Now we discuss how to control the quantity I∞(Xi;Y ) with respect to (11).
We first formalize the reasons which make Assumption 1 hold. Note that
H(X) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Xi) ≤
n∑
i=1
log |Xi|, (18)
with equality to the first inequality if and only if X1, . . . , Xn are independent,
and with equality to the second inequality if and only if each Xi has uniform
distribution over Xi [14]. Therefore, there are mainly two reasons which make
H(X) ≥ b:
1. The random variables X1, . . . , Xn are not strongly dependent.
2. There exist some Xi’s with H(Xi) > 0.
Traditionally, we can use the mutual information I(Xi;X(i)) and the entropy
H(Xi) to characterize the above two reasons, respectively. However, for mathe-
matical convenience, we develop four parameters to characterize them:
1. Use the parameter k to denote the maximal number of dependent random
variables in X .
2. Use the parameter δ to denote the maximal dependent extent among the
random variables X .
3. Use the parameter ℓ to denote the maximal number of random variables in
X with H(Xi) > 0.
4. Use the parameter τ to characterize the minimal entropies of the above ℓ
random variables.
Subsequently, also for mathematical convenience, we will approximate the set ∆b
in (11) with a set τℓP
δ
k, which is parameterized by the four parameters k, δ, ℓ, τ
and will be defined later; that is,
∆b = {X ∈ P : H(X) ≥ b} ≈
τ
ℓP
δ
k. (19)
In the following parts of this section, we will explicitly define k, δ, ℓ, τ and then
τ
ℓP
δ
k and discuss how to control I∞(Xi;Y ) based on them.
4.1 The Parameter k
Recall that the parameter k denotes the maximal number of dependent random
variables in X , which is mainly motivated by the group privacy method in [46] to
deal with the dependent problem and by the need to explain differential privacy
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using the information privacy model. Let Pk be the largest subset of P such that,
for any X ∈ Pk, the maximal number of dependent random variables within X
is at most k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Formally, let
Pk =

X ∈ P : Pr[X = x] = Pr[XI = xI ]
∏
i∈[n]−I
Pr[Xi = xi], ∀x ∈ Z

 (20)
where I ∈ [n] with |I| ≤ k, each xI ∈ XI , each xi ∈ Xi for i ∈ [n]−I. Note that, in
this manner, P equals Pn and P1 denotes the universe of probability distributions
of the independent random variables X1, . . . , Xn. We have the following result.
Theorem 1. The mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to
Pk if and only if M satisfies
max
x,y∈D,r∈R:‖x−y‖1≤k
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(y) = r]
≤ exp(ǫ). (21)
Proof. Let X = (Xi, X¯(i), X˜(i)) ∈ Pk, where X¯(i), X˜(i) denote the random vari-
ables in X which are independent to and dependent to Xi, respectively. Let
x¯(i), x˜(i) and X¯(i), X˜(i) denote one assignment and the record universe of X¯(i), X˜(i),
respectively.
“⇐” Assume the inequality (21) holds. For one x¯(i), setMx¯(i) = maxxi∈Xi,x˜(i)∈X˜(i)
Pr[M(xi, x¯(i), x˜(i)) = r], mx¯(i) = minxi∈Xi,x˜(i)∈X˜(i) Pr[M(xi, x¯(i), x˜(i)) = r]. We
have
Pr[Xi = xi, Y = r]
Pr[Xi = xi] Pr[Y = r]
=
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
∑
x˜(i)∈X˜(i)
Pr[M(xi,x¯(i),x˜(i))=r] Pr[X¯(i)=x¯(i),X˜(i)=x˜(i)|Xi=xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi=x′i]
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
∑
x˜(i)∈X˜(i)
Pr[M(x′
i
,x¯(i),x˜(i))=r] Pr[X¯(i)=x¯(i),X˜(i)=x˜(i)|Xi=x
′
i
]
≤
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
∑
x˜(i)∈X˜(i)
Mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i)=x¯(i),X˜(i)=x˜(i)|Xi=xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi=x′i]
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
∑
x˜(i)∈X˜(i)
mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i)=x¯(i),X˜(i)=x˜(i)|Xi=x
′
i
]
=
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
Mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
=a
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
Mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)]
≤b
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
Mx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x¯(i)∈X¯(i)
e−ǫMx¯(i) Pr[X¯(i) = x¯(i)]
= eǫ,
(22)
where =a is due to the independence between X¯(i) and Xi, and ≤b is due to the
inequality (21) and that there are at most k random variables in (Xi, X˜(i)).
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“⇒” Assume M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to Pk. Without
loss of generality, assume the two datasets (x¯1, x¯(1), x˜(1)), (xˆ1, x¯(1), xˆ(1)) ∈ D of
distance ≤ k and r¯ ∈ R satisfy
max
x,y∈D,r∈R:‖x−y‖1≤k
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(y) = r]
=
Pr[M(x¯1, x¯(1), x˜(1)) = r¯]
Pr[M(xˆ1, x¯(1), xˆ(1)) = r¯]
. (23)
We construct the following probability distribution in Pk. Set Pr[X1 = xˆ1] =
1,Pr[X¯(1) = x¯(1)] = 1, Pr[X˜(1) = x˜(1)|X1 = x¯1] = 1, Pr[X˜(1) = xˆ(1)|X1 = xˆ1] =
1. Then
Pr[M(x¯1, x¯(1), x˜(1)) = r¯]
Pr[M(xˆ1, x¯(1), xˆ(1)) = r¯]
=
Pr[X1 = x¯1, Y = r¯]
Pr[X1 = x¯1] Pr[Y = r¯]
(24)
by the first two lines of the equation (22). Furthermore, since M satisfies ǫ-
information privacy with respect Pk, we have
Pr[M(x¯i, x¯(i), x˜(i)) = r¯]
Pr[M(xˆi, x¯(i), xˆ(i)) = r¯]
≤ exp(ǫ), (25)
which gives (21) by the equation (23).
The proof is complete. ⊓⊔
Note that Pn = P. There are the following corollaries for P1 and P.
Corollary 2. The mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to
P1 if and only if
max
x,x′∈D,r∈R:‖x−x′‖1≤1
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
≤ exp(ǫ), (26)
and therefore if and only if M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Corollary 3. The mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to
P if and only if M satisfies
max
x,y∈D,r∈R
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(y) = r]
≤ exp(ǫ). (27)
Corollary 2, which is also appeared in [19] and is in some extent equivalent
to [22, Theorem 4.5, Theorem 4.8], implies that the differential privacy model ef-
fectively controls I∞(Xi;Y ) when the adversary’s knowledge X are independent
random variables.
Corollary 3 is equivalent to [19, Theorem 3.1], which is also appeared in
Proposition 4 and implies Corollary 1. It implies that the differential privacy
model can’t effectively control I∞(Xi;Y ) when the adversary’s knowledge X are
dependent random variables.
Notice that there is a drawback when using Theorem 1 to balance privacy
and utility: hard to set the value of k. This is because of that small k will result in
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bad privacy since, in general, this may result in the parameter b in Assumption
1 to be large, and then result in Assumption 1 doesn’t hold, and that large k will
obviously result in poor utility. Therefore, except the parameter k, there should
be another one parameter δ to model the dependent extent among X , which is
the task of Section 4.2.
4.2 The Parameter δ
The parameter δ denotes the dependent extent among X , which is mainly moti-
vated by the “correlated sensitivity” in [47], the “dependence coefficient” in [48]
and the “multiplicative influence matrix” in [37].
The dependence among the individuals is popular. For example, the spread-
ing of the Black Death in the 14th century10 and the spreading of the SARS
coronavirus in 2002-200311 (if without effective controlling) show that people
all over the world are dependent. Furthermore, the small world phenomenon
[49,50] also shows the dependence among people. However, the dependent ex-
tent of these relationships are low and therefore an adversary, in general, will
have low dependent relationship knowledge. We now consider how to measure
the dependent extent among X .
Traditionally, it is appropriate to use I(Xi;X(i)) to measure the depen-
dent extent between Xi and X(i). However, for mathematical convenience, we
develop a new quantity δ to measure it. Roughly speaking, I(Xi;X(i)) uses
log
Pr[X(i)=x(i)]
Pr[X(i)=x(i)|Xi=xi]
but δ uses Pr[X(i) = x(i)] − Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi] to
measure it. Note that the independence among X ensures that, for each Xi,
there are Pr[X(i) = x(i)] = Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi] for all xi ∈ Xi and all
x(i) ∈ X(i). This implies that the weak dependence among X will result in
Pr[X(i) = x(i)] ≈ Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi] for all xi ∈ Xi and all x(i) ∈ X(i), and
then result in
Pr[X(i) = x(i)] ≈ min
{
Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi],Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
}
for any two records xi, x
′
i ∈ Xi and all x(i) ∈ X(i). By setting
ax(i),xi,x′i = min
{
Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi],Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
}
(28)
we can therefore use
max
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
(
Pr[X(i) = x(i)]− ax(i),xi,x′i
)
= 1− min
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i),xi,x′i
(29)
to measure the dependence extent between Xi and X(i). In this manner, we can
use
σ := 1− min
i∈[n]
min
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i),xi,x′i (30)
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Death
11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SARS_coronavirus
18 Genqiang Wu, Xianyao Xia and Yeping He
to measure the dependence extent among X ; that is, if σ is small (≈ 0), the
dependence extent among X would be weak. Note that 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 since
0 ≤
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
0 ≤
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i),xi,x′i ≤
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi] = 1.
In the following part of this section, for notational simplicity, we set ax(i) :=
ax(i),xi,x′i. Let
P
δ = {X ∈ P : σ ≤ exp(δ)} (31)
denote the set of probability distributions satisfying σ ≤ exp(δ), where δ ∈
[−∞, 0] and then exp(δ) ∈ [0, 1]. Then smaller δ implies that X are low depen-
dent if X ∈ Pδ. Therefore, we can use δ to denote the dependence extent among
X . We have the following results about ∆ = Pδ.
Theorem 2. Assume the mechanism M satisfy ǫ/n-differential privacy. Then
max
i∈[n]
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ exp
( ǫ
n
)
× (1− exp(δ)) + exp(ǫ)× exp(δ), (32)
for all X ∈ Pδ.
Proof. Let X ∈ Pδ. For any i ∈ [n] and any x(i) ∈ X(i), set bx(i) = Pr[X(i) =
x(i)|Xi = xi] − ax(i) and cx(i) = Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i] − ax(i) . Set M =
maxx′
i
∈Xi,x(i)∈X(i) Pr[M(x
′
i, x(i)) = r], m = minx′i∈Xi,x(i)∈X(i) Pr[M(x
′
i, x(i)) =
r]. Set α = 1−
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i) . We have∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] × Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r]× Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
=
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi,x(i))=r]×ax(i)+
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi,x(i))=r]×bx(i)
∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi=x′i]
{∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′
i
,x(i))=r]×ax(i)+
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′
i
,x(i))=r]×cx(i)
}
≤
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi,x(i))=r]×ax(i)+M×
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
bx(i)
∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi=x′i]
{∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′
i
,x(i))=r]×ax(i)+m×
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
cx(i)
}
=
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] × ax(i) +M × α∑
x′i∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
{∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] × ax(i) +m× α
}
≤
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r]× ax(i) +M × α∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i) ×minx′i∈Xi Pr[M(x
′
i, x(i)) = r] +m× α
≤a
exp(ǫ/n)
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
minx′
i
∈Xi Pr[M(x
′
i, x(i)) = r]× ax(i) +M × α∑
x(i)∈X(i)
minx′
i
∈Xi Pr[M(x
′
i, x(i)) = r] × ax(i) +m× α
≤b
exp(ǫ/n)
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
m× ax(i) +m exp(ǫ)× α∑
x(i)∈X(i)
m× ax(i) +m× α
=exp
( ǫ
n
)
×
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
ax(i) + exp(ǫ)× α ≤c exp
( ǫ
n
)
(1− exp(δ)) + exp(ǫ)× exp(δ)
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where the inequality ≤a is due to the fact that M satisfies ǫ/n-differential pri-
vacy, the inequality ≤b is due to Lemma 3 and the group privacy property of
M, and the inequality ≤c is due to X ∈ P
δ.
The claim is proved. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. AssumeM satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to Pδ. Then
x(i),x
′
(i),x
′′
(i)∈X(i)
max
r∈R,xi,x′i∈Xi
Pr[M(xi,x(i))=r]×exp(δ)+Pr[M(xi,x
′′
(i))=r]×(1−exp(δ))
Pr[M(x′
i
,x(i))=r]×exp(δ)+Pr[M(x
′
i
,x′
(i)
)=r]×(1−exp(δ)) ≤ exp(ǫ),
(33)
for i ∈ [n].
Proof. Assume there exist ı¯ ∈ [n], r¯ ∈ R, x¯ı¯, x¯
′
ı¯ ∈ Xı¯ and x¯(ı¯), x¯
′
(ı¯), x¯
′′
(ı¯) ∈ X(ı¯)
such that the left side of (33) equals
Pr[M(x¯ı¯, x¯(ı¯)) = r¯]× exp(δ) + Pr[M(x¯ı¯, x¯
′′
(ı¯)) = r¯]× (1− exp(δ))
Pr[M(x¯′ı¯, x¯(ı¯)) = r¯]× exp(δ) + Pr[M(x¯
′
ı¯, x¯
′
(ı¯)) = r¯]× (1− exp(δ))
. (34)
We construct a probability distribution X ∈ Pδ as follows. Set Pr[Xı¯ = x¯
′
ı¯] = 1,
Pr[X(ı¯) = x¯(ı¯)|Xı¯ = x¯
′
ı¯] = Pr[X(ı¯) = x¯(ı¯)|Xı¯ = x¯ı¯] = exp(δ) and
Pr[X(ı¯) = x¯
′
(ı¯)|Xı¯ = x¯
′
ı¯] = Pr[X(ı¯) = x¯
′′
(ı¯)|Xı¯ = x¯ı¯] = 1− exp(δ). Then, by setting
X to be the above probability distribution, we have that (34) equals∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r]× Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r]× Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
,
which ensures the inequality (33) by combining the ǫ-information privacy ofM.
⊓⊔
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 have very interesting connections with Corollary 2
and Corollary 3. Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 show the utilities of an ǫ-information
privacy mechanism for the cases exp(δ) = 0 and exp(δ) = 1, respectively, whereas
the left side of (33) is a (mediant-like12) linear combination of the left sides of
(26) and (27) with the weight exp(δ). Furthermore, since
max
x,x′∈D,r∈R
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
≤ exp
( ǫ
n
)
(35)
is equivalent to I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ/n with respect to P which is equivalent to
exp(δ) = 1, and (26) is equivalent to I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ ǫ with respect to P1 which is
equivalent to exp(δ) = 0, the bound of I∞(Xi;Y ) in (36) is just the linear combi-
nation of the above two bounds of I∞(Xi;Y ) with the weight exp(δ). Therefore,
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 provide a (in some extent) sufficient and necessary
condition, which is a tradeoff between the sufficient and necessary conditions in
Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 with the weight exp(δ), and which shows how the
parameter δ balances privacy and utility.
By combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we have the following result.
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediant_(mathematics)
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Corollary 4. Assume the mechanism M satisfy ǫ/k-differential privacy. Then
max
i∈[n]
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ exp
( ǫ
k
)
× (1− exp(δ)) + exp(ǫ)× exp(δ), (36)
for all X ∈ Pδk, where P
δ
k = Pk ∩ P
δ.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is the combination of Theorem 2 and the proof
techniques of Theorem 1. ⊓⊔
4.3 The Parameters ℓ, τ
The parameters ℓ, τ are motivated partially by the parameters “k, δ” in [21,
Definition 2.4] and partially by the need and the works, such as [51,30,19,20,22],
to relax the differential privacy model to obtain better utility.
We now discuss how to relax the differential privacy model, from which the
parameters ℓ, τ are derived. By Corollary 2, M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if
and only if M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to P1. Note that P1
contains those probability distributions X such that H(Xi) = 0 for most or even
all i ∈ [n]; that is, the adversary can know most or even every records in the
dataset, which is a too strong assumption when the dataset is big enough as
discussed in Section 1. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there exists a
set I ⊂ [n] of individuals such that H(Xi) > 0 for i ∈ I. Formally, set
τ
ℓP =
{
X ∈ P : exp(−τ) ≤
Pr[Xi = xi]
1/|Xi|
≤ exp(τ), ∀i ∈ I with |I| ≥ ℓ
}
, (37)
where xi ∈ Xi, ℓ ∈ [n] and τ ≥ 0. Note that
exp(−τ) ≤
Pr[Xi = xi]
1/|Xi|
≤ exp(τ) (38)
ensures H(Xi) ≥ log |Xi| − τ . Then, by setting ∆ in Definition 4 to be
τ
ℓP1 :=
τ
ℓP ∩ P1, (39)
we can generate a relaxation to the differential privacy model.
Set
τ
ℓPk =
τ
ℓP ∩ Pk. (40)
We now consider the case where ℓ = n− k. Specifically, let
τ
n−kPk =
{
X ∈ P : Pr[X = x] = Pr[X(I) = x(I)]
∏
i∈I
Pr[Xi = xi], ∀x ∈ Z, (41)
where |I| = n− k, exp(−τ) ≤
Pr[Xi = xi]
1/|Xi|
≤ exp(τ) for i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi
}
. (42)
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Note that, for each X ∈ τn−kPk, there is
H(X) ≥
∑
i∈I
H(Xi) ≥
∑
i∈I
log |Xi| − |I|τ. (43)
We have the following result.
Theorem 4. For any r ∈ R, any i ∈ [n] and any I ′ ⊂ [n] \ {i} such that
|I ′| = n− k − 1, if
max
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi,xJ ,x′J∈XJ
∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(xi, xI′ , xJ ) = r] Pr[XI′ = xI′ ]∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(x′i, xI′ , x
′
J ) = r] Pr[XI′ = xI′ ]
≤ exp(ǫ), (44)
then the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to τn−kPk,
where J = [n] \ ({i} ∪ I ′) and where, for each i ∈ I ′, the Xi satisfies (38).
Proof. Let X ∈ τn−kPk. Without loss of generality, let |I
′| = n− k− 1 such that,
for each i ∈ I ′, the random variable Xi satisfies (38). Let J = [n] − I
′ − {i},
where i /∈ I ′. Then,
max
xi∈Xi,r∈R
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] Pr[X(i) = x(i)]
≤ max
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi,r∈R
∑
x
I′
∈X
I′
Pr[XI′=xI′ ]
∑
xJ∈XJ
Pr[XJ=xJ |Xi=xi] Pr[M(xi,xI′ ,xJ)=r]∑
x
I′
∈X
I′
Pr[XI′=xI′ ]
∑
xJ∈XJ
Pr[XJ=xJ |Xi=x′i] Pr[M(x
′
i
,xI′ ,xJ)=r]
≤ max
xi,x
′
i
∈Xi,xJ ,x′J∈XJ ,r∈R
∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(xi, xI′ , xJ ) = r] Pr[XI′ = xI′ ]∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(x′i, xI′ , x
′
J ) = r] Pr[XI′ = xI′ ]
≤ exp(ǫ).
(45)
The claim is proved. ⊓⊔
By setting τ = 0, we have the following result.
Corollary 5. For any r ∈ R, any i ∈ [n] and any I ′ ⊂ [n] \ {i} such that
|I ′| = n− k − 1, if
max
xi,x
′
i∈Xi,xJ ,x
′
J
∈XJ
∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(xi, xI′ , xJ) = r]∑
xI′∈XI′
Pr[M(x′i, xI′ , x
′
J) = r]
≤ exp(ǫ), (46)
then the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to 0n−kPk,
where J = [n] \ ({i} ∪ I ′) and where, for each i ∈ I ′, the Xi satisfies (38) where
τ = 0.
The inequalities (44) and (46) are two expectation-case relaxations of the
worst-case inequality (21). Of course, we must acknowledge that the results in
Theorem 4 and Corollary 5 are somewhat weak. Currently, we are unable to
further simplify the inequalities (44) and (46) since we face some complicated
inequalities which are related to the generalized mediant inequalities13. We hope,
in future, we can find new approaches to simplify them.
13 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediant_(mathematics)
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4.4 Discussion
The idea of Section 4 is to first discuss the tradeoffs of privacy and utility based
on Pk,P
δ and τℓP individually, and then synthesize these results as those based
on τℓP
δ
k, where
τ
ℓP
δ
k := P
δ
k ∩
τ
ℓP = Pk ∩ P
δ ∩ τℓP. (47)
The results of Section 4 show that the “divide and conquer” approach works.
We stress that our final aim is to discuss how to control I∞(Xi;Y ) based on
∆b = {X ∈ P : H(X) ≥ b} ≈
τ
ℓP
δ
k. (48)
Note that k, δ are the quantities to substitute for the mutual information
to measure the dependent extent among X . Currently, we are unable to know
the quantitative relation between k, δ and the mutual information I(Xi;X(i)),
which results in that we are unable to know the quantitative relation between
k, δ, ℓ, τ and b. Nevertheless, at least qualitatively, we can find suitable k, δ, ℓ, τ
to let (48) hold.
Clearly, setting ∆ to be τℓP
δ
k would be more reasonable and flexible than to
be P1, which implies that, theoretically, ǫ-information privacy with respect to
τ
ℓP
δ
k will achieve more privacy and utility than ǫ-differential privacy by Corollary
2.
Proposition 4 shows the badness of big datasets to data privacy; that is, when
the number n of individuals increases, the utility of data must be bad in order
to satisfy information privacy. Conversely, Assumption 1 shows the goodness of
big datasets to data privacy; that is, when the number n of individuals increases,
the lower bound b of the uncertainty H(X)’s of adversaries in the set
∆b = {X ∈ P : H(X) ≥ b} ≈
τ
ℓP
δ
k, (49)
increases accordingly, which provides us opportunities to improve the utility of
data. Explicitly, when n increases, the parameter b increases, which results in
that the parameters δ, ℓ increase, the parameter τ decreases and the parameter
k increase (but slowly than n), which provides us opportunities to improve the
utility of data by using the results in Section 4. This in some extent implies
that the information privacy model achieves the so called “crowd-blending pri-
vacy” [30], but of a flavor different from [30]; that is, an individual’s privacy is
“blended” with the adversaries’ uncertainty to other individuals’ data.
Computational Complexity Relaxation Note that the perfect secrecy can
be considered as a special case of the information privacy by setting n = 1, ∆ =
P, ǫ = 0. Similarly, the semantic security [10,11] can also be considered as a spe-
cial case of the information privacy, roughly, by setting n = 1, ǫ = O(1/ logt |X |)
and ∆ = Pppt, where Pppt is the subset of P that the PPT adversaries can
evaluate. Also, it is direct to define “computational” information privacy similar
as in [11,52], just by setting
∆ = Pppt (50)
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and ǫ = ǫ+ O(1/(n log |X |)t). Note that the zero-knowledge privacy model [53]
is essentially equivalent to the information privacy with respect to Pppt. One
important thing is to discuss the information privacy with respect to
∆b,ppt := ∆b ∩ Pppt ≈
τ
ℓP
δ
k,ppt :=
τ
ℓP
δ
k ∩ Pppt. (51)
Noticing that there have been many works on “computational” differential pri-
vacy [52,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61], the “computational” information privacy with
respect to τℓP
δ
k,ppt would be one interesting future work.
5 Group Privacy
The group privacy problem is to study how to preserve the privacy of a group
of individuals. Let I = {i1, . . . , is} ⊆ [n] and XI = (Xi1 , . . . , Xis). The group
privacy of the group of individuals XI is to let the mutual information I(XI ;Y )
or the max-mutual information I∞(XI ;Y ) be controllable.
Definition 6 (Group Information Privacy). For non-empty set I = {i1, . . . , is}
⊆ [n], set (I) = [n] \ I = {is+1, . . . , in}. Set XI = (Xi1 , . . . , Xis), X(I) =
(Xis+1 , . . . , Xin). Let ∆ ⊆ P. The quantities XI ,X(I), xI , and x(I) are set ac-
cordingly. A mechanism M satisfies c-group information privacy with respect to
∆ if for any X ∈ ∆ and any non-empty set I ⊆ [n], there is
max
xI∈XI ,r∈R
∑
x(I)∈X(I)
Pr[M(xI ,x(I))=r] Pr[X(I)=x(I)|XI=xI ]∑
x′
I
∈XI
Pr[XI=x′I ]
∑
x(I)∈X(I)
Pr[M(x′
I
,x(I))=r] Pr[X(I)=x(I)|XI=x
′
I
] ≤ exp(|I|cǫ),
where c is a positive constant.
Differential privacy has the good property that a mechanism satisfying ǫ-
differential privacy will ensure to satisfy 1-group differential privacy as shown in
Lemma 1, which implies that ǫ-information privacy with respect to P1 implies 1-
group information privacy with respect to P1 by Corollary 2. We now generalize
this result to Pk.
Theorem 5. AssumeM satisfies ǫ-information privacy with respect to Pk. Then
M satisfies 1-group information privacy with respect to Pk, where k ∈ [n].
Proof. Let X ∈ Pk. By using the proving techniques in Theroem 1, we have∑
x(I)∈X(I)
Pr[M(xI , x(I)) = r] Pr[X(I) = x(I)|XI = xI ]∑
x′
I
∈XI
Pr[XI = x′I ]
∑
x(I)∈X(I)
Pr[M(x′I , x(I)) = r] Pr[X(I) = x(I)|XI = x
′
I ]
≤ max
x,x′:|x−x′|1≤|I|−1+k
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
≤a exp
((⌈
|I| − 1
k
⌉
+ 1
)
ǫ
)
≤ exp(|I|ǫ),
where ≤a is due to (21).
The claim is proved. ⊓⊔
Currently, we lack some techniques to prove the group privacy properties for
P
δ, τℓP and then
τ
ℓP
δ
k. However, we believe they are true, whose proofs would be
one future work.
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6 Composition Privacy
The composition privacy problem is to study how to guarantee privacy while
multiple datasets or multiple query results are output. There are two kinds of
scenarios. First, multiple query results of one dataset are output. We call this
kind of scenario as the basic composition privacy problem. To differential privacy,
the privacy problem of this scenario is treated by the composition privacy prop-
erty [39,41,62] as shown in Lemma 2. Second, multiple query results of multiple
datasets generated by the same group of individuals are output, respectively.
We call this knid of scenario as the general composition privacy problem. For
example, the independent data publications of data of the Netflix and the IMDb
[26], the independent data publications of the online and offline data [63], and
the independent data publications of the voter registration data and the medical
data [31]. For each of the above applications, the composition attack [64,26] tech-
niques may employ the relationship between/among different datasets/queries
to infer the privacy of individuals whose data is contained in these datasets.
6.1 The Basic Composition Privacy
The basic composition privacy problem, i.e., the privacy problem of multiple
queries of a dataset, can be modeled as follows. For the sourcesX = (X1, . . . , Xn)
and the s query outputs Y 1, . . . , Y s, the composition privacy is to let I(Xi;Y
1, . . . ,
Y s) or I∞(Xi;Y
1, . . . , Y s) be controllable.
Definition 7 (Basic Composition Privacy). AssumeMi satisfies ǫi-information
privacy with respect to ∆ and let Y i be its output random variable, i ∈ [s]. Then
the composition mechanism M, which is defined as
M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Ms(x)), x ∈ D, (52)
is said to satisfy c-basic composition information privacy with respect to ∆ if,
for each X ∈ ∆, there are
I∞(Xi;Y ) ≤ c
s∑
i=1
ǫi, i ∈ [n], (53)
where Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y s), c is a positive constant, and
Pr[M(x) = r] =
s∏
j=1
Pr[Mj(x) = rj ], (54)
for r = (r1, . . . , rs).
Note that, by combining Lemma 2 with Corollary 2, we have that ǫ-information
privacy with respect to P1 implies 1-basic composition information privacy with
respect to P1. We now generalize this result to Pk.
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Theorem 6. Let M be as shown in Definition 7 and let ∆ = Pk. Then M
satisfies 1-basic composition privacy with respect to Pk.
Proof. Let X ∈ Pk. By using the proving techniques in Theroem 1, we have∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(xi, x(i)) = r]× Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = xi]∑
x′
i
∈Xi
Pr[Xi = x′i]
∑
x(i)∈X(i)
Pr[M(x′i, x(i)) = r] × Pr[X(i) = x(i)|Xi = x
′
i]
≤ max
|x−x′|1≤k
Pr[M(x) = r]
Pr[M(x′) = r]
≤a
s∏
j=1
max
|x−x′|1≤k
Pr[Mj(x) = r]
Pr[Mj(x′) = r]
≤ exp

 s∑
j=1
ǫj

 ,
where ≤a is due to (54).
The claim is proved. ⊓⊔
6.2 The General Composition Privacy
In this section, we discuss the general composition privacy problem. We remark
that this problem is different from the basic composition privacy problem in
Section 6.1, where the former is to output different privacy-preserving results of
the different datasets generated by a same group of individuals but the later is
to output different privacy-preserving results of the same dataset. Except some
simple discussions in [19, Section 9.1], this is an almost unexplored problem
in privacy protection. In this scenario, an individual Xi should be represented
by a stochastic process Xi := {X
t
i : t ∈ T } (but not a random variable as
in former sections). The output Y also should be represented by a stochastic
process Y := {Y t : t ∈ T }. In this setting, we need to control the value of the
mutual information
I(Xi;Y ) = I
(
{Xti : t ∈ T }; {Y
t : t ∈ T }
)
. (55)
That is, the outputs {Y t : t ∈ T } should contain little information of each
individual {Xti : t ∈ T } that the adversary can obtain. For the information
privacy, we need to control the quantity
I∞(Xi;Y ) = I∞
(
{Xti : t ∈ T }; {Y
t : t ∈ T }
)
, (56)
which is formalized as the following definition.
Definition 8 (General Composition Privacy/Privacy for Stochastic Pro-
cesses). Let X := (X1, . . . , Xn) be the sources, where each Xi := {X
t
i : t ∈
T } is a stochastic process. Let P be the universe of probability distributions of
X and let let ∆ ⊆ P. Let P{t} be the universe of probability distributions of
Xt := (Xt1, . . . , X
t
n) and let ∆
t ⊆ P{t}. Set x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi :=
{xti : t ∈ T } with x
t
i ∈ X
t
i . Set X(i) = (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn) and
x(i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Set Xi =
∏
t∈T X
t
i , X(i) =
∏
j∈[n]\{i} Xj.
Let M be a mechanism and let Y := {Y t : t ∈ T } be the output stochastic pro-
cess valued in a domain R :=
∏
t∈T R
t, where, for each r := {rt : t ∈ T } ∈ R,
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there are rt ∈ Rt, t ∈ T . For each x = {xt : t ∈ T } ∈
∏n
i=1 Xi, a mechanism
M := {Mt : t ∈ T } is defined as
M(x) = {Mt(xt) : t ∈ T }.
Assume eachMt satisfies ǫt-information privacy with respect to ∆
t, t ∈ T . Then
the mechanism M satisfies c-general composition privacy with respect to ∆ if,
for each X ∈ ∆, there are
I∞(Xi;Y ) = I∞
(
{Xti , t ∈ T }; {Y
t, t ∈ T }
)
≤ c
∑
t∈T
ǫt, i ∈ [n], (57)
where c is a positive constant, and
Pr[M(x) = r] =
∏
t∈T
Pr[Mt(x) = rt]. (58)
We now show that the basic composition privacy problem in Definition 7 is
a special case of the general composition privacy problem in Definition 8 where,
for each stochastic process Xi := {X
t
i : t ∈ T }, the random variables X
t
i , t ∈ T
are all equal.14 The result is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let the notations be as shown in Definition 8. Assume, for each
i ∈ [n], the random variables Xti , t ∈ T in the stochastic process Xi := {X
t
i : t ∈
T } are all equal. Then, for any x1i and any r, there is
Pr[Xi = x¯i, Y = r]
Pr[Xi = x¯i] Pr[Y = r]
=
Pr[X1i = x
1
i , Y = r]
Pr[X1i = x
1
i ] Pr[Y = r]
, (59)
where x¯i = {x
t
i : t ∈ T } with x
t
i ≡ x
1
i for t ∈ T , which implies I∞(Xi;Y ) =
I∞(X
1
i ;Y ).
Proof. Note that
Pr[X1i = x
1
i , Y = r] =
∑
x
(1)
i
∈X
(1)
i
Pr[X1i = x
1
i , X
(1)
i = x
(1)
i , Y = r] (60)
=Pr[Xi = x¯i, Y = r] (61)
since the random variables X1i , . . . , X
|T |
i are equal. Similarly, there is Pr[Xi =
x¯i] = Pr[X
1
i = x
1
i ]. The equation (59) follows by the above two results. The
equation I∞(Xi;Y ) = I∞(X
1
i ;Y ) is an immediate corollary of the equation
(59). ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. LetM be as shown in Definition 8. For each t ∈ T , letMt satisfy
ǫt-information privacy with respect to P
{t}
k , which is similarly defined as in (20).
Then M satisfies 1-general composition privacy with respect to Pk.
Proof. The proof is similar with the proof of Theorem 6. ⊓⊔
14 The definition of the equality of random variables please see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_variable
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Independent Applications Scenario For some applications, the assumption
of the independence among different applications are reasonable. For example,
for a group of individuals, their shopping data in Amazon would be independent
(or less dependent) to their research data in DBLP, or their health data would
be independent (or less dependent) to their movie rating data in IMDb. There-
fore, for the above applications, it is in some extent reasonable to assume that
an adversary’s knowledge is only limited to be the independent relationship of
different datasets. This setting can be modeled as that the |T | random vectors
(X1, Y 1), . . . , (X |T |, Y |T |) are independent, where Xj = (Xj1 , . . . , X
j
n).
Proposition 6. Let the notations be as shown in Definition 8. Assume the |T |
random vectors (X1, Y 1), . . . , (X |T |, Y |T |) are mutually independent. Then, for
each i ∈ [n], any xi ∈ Xi and any r ∈ R, there are
Pr[Xi = xi, Y = r]
Pr[Xi = xi] Pr[Y = r]
=
∏
t∈T
Pr[Xti = x
t
i, Y
t = rt]
Pr[Xti = x
t
i] Pr[Y
t = rt]
, (62)
and I∞(Xi;Y ) =
∑
t∈T I∞(X
t
i ;Y
t).
Proof. The equation (62) is due to the independence of the |T | random vectors
(X1, Y 1), . . . , (X |T |, Y |T |), which implies I∞(Xi;Y ) =
∑
t∈T I∞(X
t
i ;Y
t). ⊓⊔
Note that, in Proposition 6, for each t, the random variables Xt1, . . . , X
t
n, Y
t
do not need to be mutually independent.
6.3 Discussion
The information privacy model for stochastic processes in Definition 8 is powerful
to model the privacy problems of many complicated application scenarios, such
as those applications in the start of Section 6. For each of these applications
scenarios, the composition attack [64,26] technique may employ the relation
between/among different datasets to infer the privacy of individuals whose data
is contained in these datasets. Definition 8 accurately models an adversary’s
knowledge about relationship among the datasets generated by the individuals
and our idea is to set
∆ = {X ∈ P : H(X) ≥ b} ≈ τℓP
δ
k. (63)
In this manner, the information privacy model would be immune to the compo-
sition attack.
Currently, we lack some techniques to prove the composition privacy prop-
erties for Pδ, τℓP and then
τ
ℓP
δ
k. However, we believe they are true, whose proofs
would be one future work.
Furthermore, Definition 8 is also suitable to model the privacy problems of
the streaming data [65], the set-valued data [41] and the trajectory data [66]
applications. Notice that, when modeling these application scenarios, the sub-
mechanisms M1, . . . ,M|T | may be dependent ; that is, the equation (58) would
not hold. (Of course, these application scenarios are more suitable to be modeled
by Definition 4 where both each Xi and Y are a stochastic process.)
28 Genqiang Wu, Xianyao Xia and Yeping He
7 Other Related Works
Data privacy protection has a long history [67,4] and has been developing rapidly
for the last decade [3,2,24,25]. We now briefly summarize other related works.
The k-anonymity model [31] is the first privacy model that obtains exten-
sive study. To a dataset, its main idea is to generalize the identifiers and the
semi-identifier attributes to ensure at least k records has the same identifiers
and the semi-identifiers. However, the k-anonymity model does not change the
sensitive attributes in order to preserve data utility. Later, researchers find that
the sensitive attributes themself disclose privacy. This urges the development
of many variants of the k-anonymity model, such as the ℓ-diversity [68] and t-
closeness [69] among others. However, these variants still have many drawbacks.
Therefore, a more rigorous privacy model is needed.
There are a lot of works to adapt differential privacy to be resistant to de-
pendent relationship attacks. The paper [70] is believed to be the first to point
out that differential privacy is vulnerable to the dependent relationship attack.
The paper [46] uses the group privacy property of differential privacy (Lemma
1) to deal with the dependent relationship attack. Explicitly, if there are at most
k sources are dependent, one can alleviate the influence of dependent sources to
the privacy guarantee of differential privacy by achieving ǫ/k-differential privacy
or, equivalently, by multiplying k to the global sensitivity of the query func-
tion. This treatment is similar with the result of Theorem 1 and motivates the
parameter k in Section 4.1. However, since large k will result in poor utility
as discussed in the last part of Section 4.1, the paper [47] and the paper [48]
introduce the notions of “correlated sensitivity” and “dependence coefficient”,
respectively. The two notions can be explained as introducing a dependent co-
efficient (which is much less than 1 in general) between/among individuals to
decrease the raising speed of the global sensitivity of the query function. The
two notions motivate the parameter δ in Section 4.2. Although the two notions
can add less noise than the group privacy method, the privacy guarantee of the
two methods have less theoretical foundation, whereas the result in Theorem 2
achieves similar aim as the above methods but with strong privacy guarantee as
shown in Proposition 1.
The paper [71] is an application of the Pufferfish model and designs some
mechanisms. The paper [35] relates differential privacy with the conditional
mutual information I(Xi;Y |X(i)), where I(Xi;Y |X(i)) ≤ ǫ is proved to be
weaker than ǫ-differential privacy but stronger than (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
By combining the above result with Corollary 2, we have that the quantity
I(Xi;Y |X(i)) ≤ ǫ can’t resist the dependent relation attack. By Proposition 2,
the ǫ-inferential privacy model in [37] can be considered as a special case of
our model. Furthermore, the method to measure dependence extent in Corollary
4 is more simpler than the corresponding one in [37] since the latter needs to
compute complicated matrix operations, such as the matrix inverse.
The paper [72] relates the utility function in Exponential mechanism to the
rate distortion function and then discusses the relation between information
leakage and privacy. Another kind of work for treating differential privacy via
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information theory is to measure the bound of noise complexity of differential
privacy output [36,73,54]. Our model uses the relative entropyD(Xi‖(Xi|Y = r))
and the mutual information I(Xi;Y ) to treat the dependent sources problem
of differential privacy. The results in Proposition 1 show that the information
privacy model can ensure individual information disclosure to be upper bounded
by a small value ǫ.
The outlier privacy model [51] tries to reduce the influence of the outlier
records to the model’s output. Conversely, the information privacy model tries
to “utilize” the outlier records; specifically, in general, the more outlier records
in the queried dataset, the more larger of H(X) and then the more larger of b
in Assumption 1, which provides more opportunities to improve utility.
8 Conclusion
The main obstacle to adopt Bayesian inference-based privacy models is that
these models put restrictions to adversaries’ knowledges but can’t provide the
reasonability of these restrictions. This paper shows that Assumption 1 is a
very reasonable restriction to adversaries’ knowledges and simultaneously allows
flexible approaches to balance privacy and utility.
Of course, we must acknowledge that, even though there are many reasonable
evidences, Assumption 1 is really not as stronger as the hardness assumptions
in cryptography; the latter are founded on the computational complexity theory
[74,11,10] but the former seems can’t. This reminds us of Edmonds’ remark
[75]: “It would be unfortunate for any rigid criterion to inhibit the practical
development of algorithms which are either not known or known not to conform
nicely to the criterion.” Therefore, maybe, we should allow the existence of
Assumption 1 due to its usefulness in data privacy even though it doesn’t conform
nicely to the computational complexity criterion.
Furthermore, this paper leaves many unsolved problems. First, the utility
bounds about the parameter ℓ, τ need to be further explored. Second, we only
prove the group privacy and the composition privacy properties about the pa-
rameter k; the two properties about the parameters δ, ℓ, τ also need to be ex-
plored. Third, how to control I(Xi;Y ) and maxr∈RD(Xi|Y = r‖Xi) is another
one urgent future work in order to provide more choices to balance privacy and
utility. Fourth, the computational information privacy with respect to ∆ in (51)
is another one interesting future work.
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Table 1: Table of notation
Notation Description
‖z‖1 the ℓ1-norm of the real vector z
n, [n] the number of individuals, the set {1,. . . , n}, respectively
I , XI the subset {i1, . . . , iℓ} of [n], the vector (Xi1 , . . . , Xiℓ), respectively
Xi the random variable denoting the ith individual
Y the output random variable
I(Xi;Y ) the mutual information of Xi and Y
I∞(Xi;Y ) the max-mutual information of Xi and Y
H(X) the entropy of X
X(i) the random vector (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn)
x(i) the vector (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
Xi the record universe of the ith individual Xi
X(i) the Cartesian set X1 × · · · × Xi−1 × Xi+1 × · · · × Xn
X the set ∪ni=1Xi \ {⊥}, where ⊥ denotes an empty record
X the sequence of the individuals (X1, . . . , Xn)
Z the universe of record sequences
∏
n
i=1 Xi
D the universe of datasets
R a set containing the query function f ’s codomain {f(x) : x ∈ D}
P the universe of probability distribution over Z (or over D)
∆ a subset of P
X ∈ ∆ the probability distribution of X is in ∆
k the maximum number of dependent individuals
δ the dependent extent among the individuals
τ the parameter to measure the uncertainty of the adversary to each individual
ℓ the parameter to measure the number of unknown individuals
P
δ the subset of P with dependent parameters ≤ δ
Pk the subset of P with dependent parameters ≤ k
τ
ℓP the subset of P with parameters τ, ℓ
τ
ℓP
δ
k the set Pk ∩ P
δ ∩ τℓP
PPT the abbreviation of “probabilistic polynomial time”
Pppt the subset of P that the PPT adversaries can evaluate
